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I examine associations of mass media and information and communications technologies 
(ICTs) with inequality and poverty. I find that newspaper circulation has a robust 
negative association with inequality. Radios and TVs also have a negative association with 
poverty. ICT expenditures (as a percentage of GDP) have a negative association with 
poverty. An ICT index is constructed which also has a negative association with poverty. 
An instrumental variable analysis confirms the robust negative association between 
newspaper circulation and inequality. 
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The rise of mass media as an indispensible accessory of modern society’s access to 
information has been phenomenal. The availability of information is crucial for efficient 
decision making by citizens and consumers (Stigler 1961, Stiglitz 2000). For the voter, 
information about government actions and political candidates is essential for accurate 
voting choices. Likewise, consumers and investors require information to purchase products 
and securities.  
Access to information is, however, circumscribed by the instruments that are made 
available to the citizen. Less developed economies particularly suffer from the lack of 
adequate communications technologies. While access to communications infrastructure and 
information is largely asserted to be a prerequisite for growth and productivity, there is 
little empirical evidence which establishes this fact. This paper empirically investigates the 
association of Information Communications Technologies (hereafter ICTs) and mass media 
as instruments of access to information, with inequality and poverty. 
The impact of ICTs and telephony, is a double edged innovation - one which results 
in both driving economic growth and in increasing spatial and individual inequalities. 
While increasing returns and technological progress are conceptually distinct, both theory 
and evidence seem to suggest that they often come together and result in technological 
lock-in (David 1985), such that technologies that have an initial advantage tend to endure. 
Prominent theories on the sources of economic growth reinforce such concerns. The 
‘weightless’ properties of such technologies, with little regard for geographical barriers 
(Quah 2001a, b) enhance their rapid spread. These properties, however, due to unequal 
adoption rates, are predisposed to result in rapid increases in spatial and individual 
inequalities. Thus, in an LDC context, concentration in telephony and ICT penetration is 
likely to wedge the urban and the rural areas apart, as well as the rich and poor. Skill-
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biased technologies such as those engendered by development of ICTs may also result in 
high wage inequalities - studies of the US increasing wage gap evince that skill-biased 
technological change (as a consequence of the increasing computerisation of the US work 
force) is an important driving force of US wage inequality (Acemoglu and Autor (2010), 
Autor and Dorn (2009),  Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998), Berman et al (2005), Goldin 
and Katz (1996, 2008), DiNardo and Pischke 1997). The emerging job polarisation is on 
the rise - ICTs are complementary with human capital and rapid falls in quality-adjusted 
ICT prices have therefore increased skill demand. There is a large body of literature 
broadly consistent with this notion.  
The task-based theory predicts that ICT improvements increase demand for the 
most educated (complementing their non-routine cognitive tasks), reduce demand for the 
middle educated (as it substitutes for routine tasks) and has ambiguous effects for the least 
educated. Michaels et al. (2013) conclude that technical change has raised relative demand 
for college educated workers and, consistent with the ICT-based polarisation hypothesis, 
this increase has come mainly from reducing the relative demand for middle-skilled workers 
rather than low-skilled workers. 
The impact of mass media, however, is less selective on its target audience and not 
likely to directly accentuate spatial or individual inequalities in the manner of ICTs. Its 
development and penetration is endogenous in a manner that ICTs are not in that the 
quality of news generated by the media industry is also dependent of how the government 
treats the media industry. Deeper media penetration, unlike ICTs, has no unequal effects 
in its impact. On the other hand, the underdevelopment of media is often a consequence of 
governments attempting to evade scrutiny from poor delivery or non-delivery of public 
goods, or government failure. Mass media functions to enhance citizens’' abilities to 
scrutinise government actions. 
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I use OLS to show that newspaper circulation is significantly associated with lower 
inequality. Radios and TVs are also found to be significantly associated with lower poverty.  
I obtain mixed results with ICTs and telephony. I find robust evidence of the 
negative association of ICT expenditures with poverty. I also construct an ICT 
infrastructure index and find that its association with inequality varies with the sample 
chosen - it is positively associated with inequality for the sample with both developed and 
developing countries, but not robustly associated with inequality for the developing 
country sample.  
To confirm these results, I undertake an instrumental variable analysis for 
newspaper circulation, using three different instruments of press freedom and legal rights 
for information. The results affirm that there exists a negative relationship between 
inequality and newspaper circulation. 
 The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 the current literature 
relating to mass media and ICT/telephony is discussed. Section 3 discusses the data and 
presents the empirical strategy and Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 deals with 
potential endogeneity with an instrumental variable analysis. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Mass Media and ICT  
2.1. Political Accountability 
2.1.1. Political Mechanisms 
 
Despite the obvious justifications that mass media creates a more educated and 
responsive citizen, it is only recently that the political economy literature has seriously 
begun to address these issues. While most countries have media in some form or another, 
there is no guarantee that it is a successful vehicle of information. This is affected by a 
variety of government actions - ranging from policy decisions affecting the regulation and 
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entry and ownership of media on the one hand, to bribery and threats to the media bodies 
on the other. Besley and Prat (2001) study the determinants and the consequences of 
captured media, and find that capture is more likely if there is more state ownership of 
newspapers and there is greater concentration in ownership of newspapers. Petrova (2008) 
focusses on media misreporting, and explains media bias by conscious manipulation by 
media owners or editors and finds that it has an impact on public expenditures on 
education and health. Corneo (2006) finds that a higher concentration in firm ownership to 
be likely asssociated with higher media bias and lower welfare. Baron (2006) also explains 
persistent media bias that originates with private information obtained by journalists and 





The existence of an active mass media body is usually seen to be associated with an 
active democracy. A small but growing cross country literature connects the incidence of a 
free press and the political framework that accompanies it. There are though countries 
which are democratic in structure but have low press freedom, especially in the developing 
world. Brunetti (2003) and Ahrend (2002) find robust correlations between press freedom 
and corruption. Djankov et al. (2003) also uncover robust cross-country evidence of state 
ownership of the media to be negatively correlated with a number of measures of good 
governance. Using a panel of 16 Indian states, 1958-1992, Besley and Burgess (2001) find 
that Indian state governments' provision of public food and calamity relief expenditure is 
more responsive to falls in food production and crop flood damage in states where 
newspaper circulation is high. The role of media in moderating business cycles is examined 
by Shi and Svensson (2002) - using a panel of 123 developed and developing countries over 
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a 21-year period, they indeed find larger political budget cycles in countries where few 
people have radios.  
Greater media outlets on the other hand are found to be encouraging for the 
emergence of a free press (Besley, Burgess and Prat 2002). Competition, though, may 
result in two different effects. While Besley and Prat argue that more media outlets are an 
impediment to politicians trying bribe the media, Mullianathan and Shleifer (2005) argue 
that greater competition could result in newspapers (or other media forms) printing or 
broadcasting stories which confirm readers' prior opinions rather than presenting the real 
facts. Other lines of research investigate governments' incentives to engage in corruption in 
the presence of independent media bodies (Vaidya 2005). 
 
2.2 The Effect of ICTs 
 
While ICTs are a principal carrier of information, its effect on economic 
development is more tangible than that of mass media - ICT carries with it technology 




Increased investment in ICT has led to significant increases in economic growth 
(Haacker and Morsinck 2002, Timmer and van Arky 2005). The US, for instance, had an 
increase in TFP by one half percentage point per year over the last two decades. Europe’s 
experience with ICT’s contribution to economic growth is relatively sporadic. Daveri (2002) 
reveals that ICT contributions to growth were significant in only 10 countries out of 14 in 
his study. In only 6 of these, was ICT related capital-deepening associated with greater 
aggregate total factor productivity or growth in labour productivity. Among the newly 
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industrialised economies in East Asia, the deepening of ICT has been of significant 
importance, particularly in production - 28% of their manufacturing exports are ICT 
products (Kenny 2003). The contribution of ICT related capital-deepening in Japan 




What prominently distinguishes the outcomes of ICTs as different from other forms 
of information carriers is that on the production front it is pervasively characterised by 
increasing returns. Arthur (1994) and Krugman (1991) emphasise that the predominance 
of increasing returns in a certain industry leads to spatial agglomeration, in a manner 
similar to how technological lock-in sets in. From this point of view, ICTs are no different 
from other industries - the location of geographic clusters simply reflects the high skilled 
and fast-producing nature of the technology. ICT clustering is more pronounced in the EU 
than in the US (Koski et al. 2000, Quah 2001a). Similarly, unequal access to ICTs and 
thus information, may exacerbate already existing individual inequalities.  
Combining all these issues, one is prompted to ask whether ICT investment is just 
growth spurring or inequality increasing, or both. Some casual empiricism as discussed 
above suggests both, but its effects are yet to be empirically established. While the 
phenomenon of spatial agglomeration is clearly understood in the literature, whether it is 
associated with increasing individual inequalities is not clear.1 The empirical analysis that 
follows attempts to uncover any such correlations between various development outcomes 






3. Data and Empirical Strategy 
 
This section discusses the data on ICTs, media, press freedom, the models estimated 
in the empirical analysis, and explains the empirical methodology used. The database has 
been put together from a variety of sources, each to be described in turn. Tables 1 and 2 
present the variable’s sources and their summary statistics, respectively. 
 
[Insert Table 1 and Table 2 here] 
 
3.1. Measures of Mass Media Penetration 
 
Mass media penetration is measured by using the number of newspapers in 
circulation, and the ownership of radios, and televisions, per 1,000 people. The principal 
data source has been the World Bank Indicators data base. 
 
3.2. Measures of ICT and Telephony 
 
The data has been compiled from the World Bank indicators data set (2004). The 
variables for which I have obtained maximum coverage of countries are the following: 
 Mobile phones (per 1,000 people) 
 Internet Users (per 1,000 people) 
 ICT expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
 Fax machines (per 1,000 people) 
 Telephone mainlines (per 1,000 people) 
 Telephone mainlines per employee 
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 Telephone revenue (per 1,000 people) 
 Number of personal computers per 100,000 people. 
There exist a large number of other ICT indicators, but the country coverage 
dramatically drops, and therefore not included in the analysis. 
To identify the collective effect of the ICT variables, I construct an index of ICT 
using factor analysis, results of which are presented in Table 3. This technique is a method 
of data reduction and attempts to describe the indicators as linear combinations of a small 
number of latent variables. I accept the first factor (f1) to be the general index of ICT and 
telephony infrastructure (presented later in tables as ICT index), which takes an 
eigenvalue of over 5. In performing the factor analysis, the data has been normalised for 
comparability of the numerical values (for example, comparing revenues in US dollars to 
number of personal computers per 1,000 people). For the estimations I mainly use the first 
factor, and for robustness I use the second factor f2. I also use the UNCTAD index of ICT 
diffusion as an alternate indicator of ICT penetration for the year 1997.2 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
3.3. Measures of inequality and poverty 
 
I use the Gini measure (of income inequality) from the WIID2b database published 
by UNU-WIDER, which documents annual measures of country Ginis, for each year 1992-
1997. I also use two measures of poverty – poverty headcount measured at $1 a day, and 
$2 dollars a day, also from the World Bank database. 
 
4. Associations of Inequality and Poverty with ICTs and media 
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In this section, I present OLS estimates of the correlations of inequality and poverty 
with ICT infrastructures and mass media. Given that the nature of the impact of any of 
these outcomes is unknown, I estimate the models using OLS. Tables 4 and 5 present the 
results with Ginis (inequality) as the dependent variable, for the full sample and 
developing country samples, respectively and Table 6 with poverty as the dependent 
variable. 
 
4.1. Inequality, and ICTs and Media 
 
In Tables 4 and 5 I present the results of the associations of media and 
Telephony/ICT variables with levels of inequality, for the full sample and developing 
country sample, respectively. The dependent variable is the Gini coefficient, obtained from 
the UNU-WIDER (2005) database (WIID2b) for years 1992-1997. I estimate models both 
for the full sample of countries, and the developing countries' sample, to observe whether 
the relationship only holds for LDCs. Figures 1 and 2 present a scatter plot of the 
relationship between inequality measured by the Gini index, and newspaper circulation per 
1,000 people. There is a clear negative relationship. We also obtain a similar negative 
relationship between poverty and newspaper circulation, as in Figure 2. These scatter plots 
are already suggestive of the results that are to obtain in the following analyses.  
     
The basic specification that I am estimating is as follows: 
 
GINIi = β₀+ β1NEWSi + β2RADIOi + β3TVi + β4ICTindexi + β₅BUREAUi + 
β₆RULEi + β₇TRADEi + β₈RISKi + εi         (1) 
 Table 1 lists the abbreviations and the sources of the variables in use. NEWSi, 
RADIOi and TVi represent the incidence of newspapers, TVs and radios in country i. The 
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ICTindexi is the index (the first factor, in most cases) that has been estimated using factor 
analysis in Section 3.2.  
I include a number of variables as controls which represent the quality of rule of law 
and institutions, which engender knowledge and information creation and its spread. Rule 
of law, presented above as RULE, is a variable obtained from the ICRG, which measures 
the extent of the citizens' capabilities to monitor the extent of corruption. It represents the 
presence of sound political institutions, a functional legal system and ‘provisions for an 
orderly succession of power’. BUREAU accounts for the quality of bureaucracy in the 
government, also provided by the ICRG based on evaluations from country experts. It 
indicates the degree of autonomy (of the bureaucracy) from political pressure. Both 
variables are typically positively associated with lower values of corruption and knowledge-
bias. 
In addition to these I include a number of country-level characteristics which act as 
proxies of determinants of the quality of rule of law and institutions.  
TRADE is a proxy for distortions and restrictions of competition in an economy. It 
measures the exposure of an economy to foreign trade and is defined as the sum of exports 
and imports as a percentage of GDP. It has been argued that open countries are subject to 
larger competitive pressure which reduces monopolistic rents (Ades and Di Tella 1999).3 I 
also include a variable collected by the ICRG, an index of expropriation risk, named here 
as RISK, which is scaled such that high values of RISK indicates low risk of appropriation.  
Given these factors, one can conjecture that higher incidence of media variables - 
such as newspapers, radios and televisions - and higher access to ICTs – such as higher 
internet usage, and deeper telecommunications' penetration – can be associated with lower 
levels of inequality. Other country specific controls are also included. Log of GDP per 
capita and Literacy measure the level of per capita GDP in 1995 (calculated at purchasing 
power parity US $), and educational attainment. These both act as proxies for external 
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controls – higher levels of GDP per capita and education serve to act to reduce inequality 
by raising personal incomes. 
I envisage the association of any of the media or ICT variables with inequality to be 
due to media and ICTs facilitating access to information and information technology. Also, 
societies with higher rule of law indicate the existence of high quality institutions and legal 
bodies, which can positively affect the impact of ICT and mass media infrastructure on 
citizen's education or awareness in general. Over time, access to information could 
translate into higher skills and thereby higher incomes. This impact, if partial across the 
distribution - that is, positively affects one section of the distribution more than others - 
may wedge the sections apart, resulting in a rise in inequality. This is often the case in 
developing countries when access to the knowledge-based technology involved is expensive, 
and infrastructure-intensive.  
The reverse may also happen; the knowledge it engenders, may ‘equalise’ society on 
some development outcomes (for example, awareness about birth control amongst men and 
women, brought about by national health programmes, brings down household size and 
thereby raises household per capita income in poor countries). ICTs and media can 
therefore serve to work either way on the extent of inequality. 
Higher international exposure via TRADE makes the economy competitive, and 
enhances the quicker spread of information and associated technologies, by bringing down 
the prices of many of these technologies. As discussed earlier with relation to RULE, its 
effect may be either positive or negative. In addition, I choose two sets of country-specific 
controls used by Perotti (1996) and Barro (1999) as has been popularly used in the 
inequality and growth literature (Banerjee and Duflo (2003)). This is because a central 
concern for the empirical literature is that any of the right hand side variables used as 
controls could proxy for omitted variables. The choice of the variables entails judgements 
about causality that are hard to substantiate. Therefore, I use an already established set of 
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controls: those used in Perotti (1996) and those used in Barro (1999). Specifications 
empirically tested for are repeated with two sets of controls. These specifications are useful 
benchmarks for two reasons. First, the Perotti specification has been used by most 
subsequent studies. Second, they represent two extremes, the Perotti specification using 
the smallest number of control variables and the Barro specification the largest. 4 The 
Perotti specification excludes most variables (in particular, investment and government 
spending) through which inequality could be affected. The variables included are male and 
female education and the purchasing power parity of investment goods, a measure of 
distortions. Barro, on the other hand, includes a much larger set of variables through 
which inequality could be affected - investment share of GDP, fertility, education and 
government spending. The interpretation of the coefficients in two regressions is therefore 
slightly different. The results presented in Table 4 allow for both sets of controls. To 
separate out the associations for developing countries only, I estimate the model for both 
the full sample of countries and the developing country sample separately, presented in 
Table 5 respectively. 
 
[Insert Tables 4 and 5 here] 
 
Table 4 presents the estimates for the full sample – Column 1 estimates the basic 
model, with the individual media and ICT and telephony variables included individually, 
and the country-level controls BUREAU, RULE, Log of GDP per capita, literacy, TRADE 
and RISK. I observe that newspaper circulation, TVs and faxes are negatively and 
significantly associated with inequality. Telephone mainlines are also negatively and 
significantly associated with inequality. Of the ICT variables, only the number of internet 
users is observed to be significant and positively associated with inequality. Inclusion of 
continent dummies in Column 3, and the Perotti controls, reveals both the Africa and 
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Latin America continent dummies to be significant. I obtain the same results with the 
Barro controls (results not presented in Table). 
For the estimates in Columns 4 to 6, I replace the individual variables with the 
ICT/telephony index estimated by factor analysis - Columns 4 and 5 present the results 
using the first factor obtained from the factor analysis exercise, with the Barro and Perotti 
controls; the ICT/telephony index is not significant when included as levels, but is positive 
and significant when included as a squared variable. Other media variables - newspapers 
and TVs continue to be negative and significant. I replace the first factor by the second 
factor obtained from the factor analysis as the ICT index in Column 6 (using Barro 
controls) - here I obtain a significant and positive co-efficient for the ICT index. In all the 
specifications, the continent dummies are significant. 
Table 5 presents the estimates for the developing countries' sample – Columns 1 
and 2 present the results for inclusion of the individual media and ICT/telephony variables, 
with the Barro and Perotti controls respectively. Newspapers are negatively and 
significantly associated with inequality, but TVs are no longer significant. Continent 
dummies are significant for both specifications. I replace the individual media and ICT 
variables with the ICT index in Columns 3 and 4 - I obtain a negative co-efficient for the 
model including the Perotti controls, but it is not significant. I include ICT index (f1) 
squared and f2 as well, and obtain no significance (result not reported in table). The same 
models were tested using the UNCTAD ICT diffusion index as well, and no significant 
results were obtained (results available from author). 
In both sets of models for full sample and developing country sample, there have 
been mixed outcomes for the country level controls – RULE for the full sample has been 
negative and significant throughout, likewise mostly for RISK, but not so for the 
developing country sample. BUREAU has also been positive and significant under some 
specifications for the developing country sample, while TRADE and literacy even rarely so. 
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Ln GDP for several specifications is positive and significant under both the full sample and 
developing country sample.  
Finally, the results tabulating the regressions of inequality on mass media and ICT 
indicators in Tables 4 and 5, established two sets of relationships. For the full sample of 
countries, the ICT index is found to be positively associated with inequality, while for the 
developing country sample, it is either not significantly associated, or weakly negatively 
associated with inequality.  
To affirm this non-linear relationship between inequality and the ICT index, I plot 
some kernel regressions of inequality (Ginis) on the ICT index to ascertain the non-linear 
nature of this relationship. The non-linear relationship between growth and development 
indicators and inequality is well documented - from Kuznets’s inverted U-curve hypothesis, 
to recent studies on inequality and growth (Banerjee and Duflo 2002, Quah 2002). It is 
well possible that a similar "stage of development" -specific relationship exists for 
inequality and the ICT infrastructure index. 
 Kernel regressions of the Gini on the ICT index are plotted for both f1 and f2 (the 
first two factors from the factor analysis exercise retained as indices of ICT) in Figures 3 
to42. I use two types of kernel estimators, the Epanechnikov estimator, and a quartic 
estimator (not presented) - both reveal similar non-linearities in the relationship between 
ICT indices and the Gini. For the regression of the Gini on the ICT index first factor, f1 in 
Figure 2, I observe that for lower values of ICT index f1, the relationship is positive, and 
for higher values of ICT index f1, it is negative. For the regression of the Gini on the ICT 
index second factor, f2 in Figure 4 I observe a clearer negative relationship, though this 
negative relationship often switches to a positive relationship for rising levels of ICT index 
f2. This result is also evinced in our regression models earlier when including a ICT (f1) 
index squared (or f2) term in addition to f1 (or f2). 
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To summarise our results obtained: 
 Inequality is found to be negatively and significantly associated with several media 
variables, most notably with newspaper circulation. Newspaper circulation is 
negative and significant under all specifications: for the full sample and developing 
country sample, and including Perotti and Barro controls. TVs are also found to be 
negatively associated with inequality, though the level of significance varies with the 
model and controls included. 
 Inequality is also found to be significantly associated with the ICT index under 
several specifications for the full sample. For the full sample models, it is positive 
and significant, particularly for the models where it is included as with higher 
orders, but for the developing country sample it is not significant. The relationship 
is sensitive to specification, and could be due to non-linearities in the relationship, 
as evinced by the kernel regression estimates (Figures 3 and 4). 
 
 
4.2. Poverty, ICTs and Media 
 
The next relationship that I will be investigating is the association of the media and 
ICT variables  with poverty. The main model estimated is 
 
POVERTYi = β₀+ β1NEWSi + β2RADIOi + β3TVi + β4ICTindexi + β₅BUREAUi 
+ β₆RULEi + β₇TRADEi + β₈RISKi + εi                                                 (2) 
 
Poverty is measured using two definitions of poverty - the one dollar a day definition 
(poverty headcount ratio at $1 a day (PPP) (% of population)), and the two dollar a day 
definition (poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day (PPP) (% of population)) of the World 
 17 
Bank over the years 1992 - 1997. I also estimated the models with the poverty headcount 
ratio at national poverty line (% of population), but due to the number of observations 
being very low, most specifications did not run. For this analysis I only consider the 
sample of LDCs (83 countries). Here again I use the same set of controls as determinants 
of poverty as before, via the same political economy routes. Controls of BUREAU and 
RULE account for good governance, and provide the institutional set up for growth and 
economic development. TRADE and RISK ensure the competitiveness required for 
economic growth and development, thereby lowering levels of poverty. One would expect a 
negative association of poverty with all of these four controls. Country level characteristics 
of log of GDP and literacy are also included, and are expected to be negatively associated 
with poverty. 
In Table 6, Column 1 presents the results of the basic specification with newspaper 
circulation, radios, and TVs as the media variables, and the ICT and telephony individual 
variables, using the one dollar a day definition of the poverty measure. Due to the small 
sample size I only include the Perotti controls, and the country-specific characteristics. 
Newspaper circulation is not significantly associated with poverty - this result holds for all 
specifications, barring Column 2 where it is positively associated with poverty. This result 
is not observed elsewhere. Radios are however, significant and negative for all models 
tested. This is observed for all the models presented, and also for any other model that has 
been tested. TVs are not significant, and this holds for most specifications using the one 
dollar a day measure of poverty. None of the individual ICT variables are significantly 
associated with poverty, but telephone revenues is positive and significant. In Column 2, I 
also observe mobile telephony to be negative and significant as well. This is a significant 
result, as the adoption of mobile telephones by the poor in developing countries is quite 
high. Most poor households can afford a pay-as-you-go mobile telephony due to the 
competitive rates provided by the service providers. TVs and newspapers are significant 
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and positive - this result is sensitive to the specification, and does not hold for the rest of 
the results presented. This result also accords with the notion that they are both cost 
intensive and thus are less affordable by the poorer sections of the income distribution. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
In the following two columns, I replace the individual ICT variables with the ICT 
index – I have tested with both ICT index (f1) and ICT index (f2) factors, and higher 
order terms (squared terms), the latter not presented, and it has not been significant in 
any of the specifications. Radios continue to be negatively and significantly associated with 
poverty. The continent dummies included in Column 4 are not significant - this is observed 
for all specifications estimated. 
Columns 5 to 7 present the results using the two dollars a day measure of poverty. I 
again observe the negative and significant association of radios with poverty, but also 
observe that TVs is also negative and significant. This result holds for all specifications 
tested with the two dollar a day measure of poverty. Of the ICT variables tested, I observe 
that ICT expenditure as a percentage of GDP to be negative and significant. Internet users 
are also observed to be negative and significant - this result holds for all specifications. 
None of the telephony variables are significant. On replacing the individual ICT variables 
with the ICT index, I do not obtain a significant co-efficient. It is possible that the ICT 
variables that are individually significant are proxying for the level of development. 
To summarise our results: 
 I find that radios are significantly and negatively associated with poverty. This 
result holds for all the models that have been estimated. TVs are also observed to 
be negative and significant particularly so for the models using $2/day poverty 
measure. 
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 The ICT index is not significantly associated with poverty. Of the individual ICT 
variables, ICT expenditures are negatively and significantly associated with poverty 




5. Issues of Endogeneity: Role of mass media 
 
One major issue to deal with is that of the potential problem of reverse causality 
between the development outcomes, inequality and poverty, and that of the media and 
ICT variables. In this section we discuss the potential sources of endogeneity, and then 
follow it with an instrumental variable analysis for the media variable, newspaper 
circulation (per 1,000 people). Of course, finding an appropriate instrument for either mass 
media or ICT variables is extremely difficult, but the instruments used below for 
newspaper circulation, in particular, provide us with some robust instrumental variable 
results.  
There are two sources of endogeneity here – both ICT and telephony variables, and 
mass media, have a two-sided impact upon the development outcomes of inequality and 
poverty. As discussed earlier, the effect of ICT and telephony variables has a double edged 
effect. On the one hand, they have a “growth” effect: ICT and telephony are infrastructure 
variables, and thereby contribute to economic growth. In addition, due to the “weightless” 
nature of ICTs, their spread is speedy and it disregards physical barriers, enhancing their 
“growth effect”. One could therefore expect, on the one hand, the impact of ICTs and 
telephony to be growth enhancing and poverty reducing (in the medium to long term). On 
the other hand, there is a distribution specific effect of ICTs and telephony, in that they 
are cost intensive for adoption. Even with the competitive prices of ICTs and their 
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weightless nature, in developing countries access to these technologies is out of reach of the 
poor (though, this is not the case for mobile telephony in LDCs). Therefore, one could 
conjecture that in industrialised countries, the ICT and telephony penetration facilitates 
the spread of information, and will likely bring down the extent of income inequality. The 
same process, though, in developing countries, will push the rich and the poor apart. 
However, the extent to which the process of inequality increase pans out in developing 
countries depends upon adoption rates. Adoption and the spread of ICTs and telephony is 
still relatively in LDCs compared to industrialised countries, hence, we may not observe a 
short term rise in inequality in LDCs even if ICTs and telephony penetration were to occur.  
Similar endogeneity can be envisaged with the case of mass media and the 
development outcomes of inequality and poverty. Mass media provides crucial information 
to the median voter and thereby influences decisions on demanding redistributive policies. 
This brings down inequality. It also creates a more educated society and thereby 
contributes to economic growth and rising per capita incomes. This also brings down 
inequality in the long run. One would also expect, however, that the instruments of media 
(such as newspapers, radios and TVs) themselves are not responsible for creating an 
educated voter or citizen. It is the nature of the news provider (public or private, national 
or foreign owned), and the quality of information (unbiased or biased) that is being 
broadcast that ultimately determines the nature of information provided. On the one hand, 
media bias (see Djankov et al 2005) is commonly understood to be less pervasive if the 
news providing bodies in a country (or region within a country) are competitive – in other 
words, single bodies such as the state media, in the absence of competing private media 
bodies is often seen as providing “propaganda”. On the other hand, in a system where 
both public and private media bodies co-exist, the news coverage of public bodies is often 
deemed to be more reliable (for example, the case of the BBC in the UK, Doordarshan in 
India, PBS in the US).  
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 Irrespective of the number and the ratio of public to private media bodies, what is 
understood to matter the most is the legal framework which ensures transparency in the 
provision of information. To this effect, several indicators of the freedom of information 
and transparency have been compiled by a number of civil society organisations. I use 
three main indicators of press freedom and transparency as instruments for newspaper 
circulation. Freedom House has compiled an index of press freedom, and ranks countries 
according to their index, the Freedom of Press Index, which is an annual survey of media 
independence in 197 countries and territories. Data for the years 1992 and 1993 are not 
available (the index starts from 1994), so our variable starts in 1994. In addition, to 
account for a broader definition of information bias and government actions against free 
press, I use the Reporters Without Borders index of press freedom using data on 
journalists arrested and murdered, in addition to standard indicators of press freedom. 
Their index starts in 2002 for most countries, otherwise from 2003, and runs till 2010. 
Given that this is a slow moving variable I have used the index from 2002 to 2007 (or 2003 
to 2008) to represent years 1992 to 1997. (I have used different starting points for the 
years and the results obtained are identical in terms of their significance). The index 
covers all countries in the dataset, except for Bahrain. There are two indicators provided, 
a score, and a ranking on the basis of the score – I use of the log of the score provided. 
I use a further index of quality of information provided by media, called the Right 
to Information Index, compiled by the Global Right to Information5. The RTI Rating is a 
system for assessing the strength of the legal framework for guaranteeing the right to 
information in a given country. The focus of the index is therefore on gauging the legal 
framework to access to information, and not on the “quality” of implementation of the 
legal framework. Over time a strong access-to-information law can contribute to advancing 
openness and help those using it to defend and promote the right of access to information. 
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The index is compiled by using 61 indicators measuring a wide range of international 
standards and laws on the right to information. For the estimations in the paper, to make 
the RTI score values comparable to other indicators, I have used the natural logarithmic 




We now undertake an instrumental variable (IV) estimation using the three 
instruments described above. The results of the estimation using Two Stage Least Squares 
is described in Table 7 for the relationship between inequality and the ICT and media 
variables. In Table 7 Panel A I present the first stage results for the determinants of 
newspaper circulation (per 1,000 households). Here I regress newspaper circulation on all 
three instruments, namely the Freedom of Press index, log of RTI index and the log on 
Reporters Without Borders score alongside the other cross-country controls used in the 
estimation of equation (1). Newspaper circulation is positively and significantly associated 
with log of RTI index and the log of Reporters Without Borders score instruments for all 
six regressions, using both Perotti and Barro controls separately. The other controls used 
are significant at several levels of significance, and in the expected directions. The Cragg-
Donald statistic in all six regressions is greater than 10 suggesting that the instruments are 
not weak (Staiger and Stock 1997). 
I now estimate equation 1 as the second stage regression and present the second 
stage results in Table 7 Panel B. The results are just as strong as in Table 4; in all cases 
the size of the co-efficient for newspapers is greater than before. Due to the small number 
of observations, I do not present the results for the developing country sample. For the 
same reason the results with poverty are not presented.  




Mass media and ICTs are two important vehicles of information in developing and 
developed countries alike. In this paper I present some robust evidence of some associations 
of ICTs and mass media with inequality and poverty.  
I observe that inequality (measured with the Gini index), is negatively associated 
with newspaper penetration – this is one of the most robust results of all estimates. The 
ICT and telephony variables and the ICT index have mixed outcomes in their associations 
with inequality - for the full sample there exists a positive association, and a weak 
association (mostly negative) for the developing country sample. ICT expenditures as a 
percentage of GDP are found to have a negative association with inequality. For poverty, 
the most prominent result observed was the negative association with the incidence of 
radios and TVs - this result has been robust to all specifications tested, particularly for 
radios. 
I also undertake an instrumental variable analysis for the newspaper circulation 
variable, using three instruments. I continue to find robust evidence that newspaper 
circulation is robustly negatively associated with inequality. In other words, higher 
newspaper circulation is found to be associated with lower levels of inequality.  
There are several avenues for future research - testing for specific political economy 
routes of causality for any of these associations will take this literature further. The 
literature on media capture and bias (Corneo 2006, Petrova 2008 for effects of income 
inequality on media bias, for example) addresses some of the issues that are tested here. 
Causality related to the effects of information infrastructures on inequality and poverty 
require micro-level empirical surveys, which the cross-country macro-approach adopted in 
this paper can only partially address. Country-specific micro-studies will therefore allow 
researchers to test for causality. 
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 The role of ICTs in developing countries is much discussed in policy spheres; 
studies which examine the micro-level impact of these infrastructures will shed light on 
their effectiveness on local level welfare. With the role of media bias being much studied in 
a cross-country context, more research on its impact in developing countries in particular, 
in light of their weak legal institutions would contribute to the developing country 
literature specifically. 
With the empirical literature on relationships between information infrastructures 
and development outcomes still at its early stages, the evidence obtained in this paper is 
convincing that there exists a significant association between media and communications 
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1 Some work in this area has been done on the impact of ICTs on wage inequalities in the 
US, see Autor et al (1998). 
2 The results using the UNCTAD index are not presented in the paper and are available 
from the author. 
3 A large number of cross country studies investigating differential development outcomes, 
have often included the extent of cultural diversification as a possible determinant of 
differential growth and development outcomes. It is purported to affect corruption in 
particular by impeding competitiveness. Ethnic fragmentation has been included in several 
specifications but has not shown up to be significant and hence is not presented. 
4  The list of variables included in both specifications are as follows: Perotti: 
Log(GDP(1990), PPP I (1990), male education (1990), female education (1990). Barro: 
Log (GDP(1990)), Log (GDP(1990)) squared, government consumption (1990-1995), 
secondary and higher education (1990), fertility (1990), 1/30*(term of trade(1995)-terms of 
trade(1990)), rule of law, democracy (1990), democracy (1990) squared, inflation (1990-
1995) and investment share (1990-1995).  
























Table 1:  Variables used in the paper and their sources. 
All years refer to the period 1992-1997 
 
Variable name Years Source 
 1994-1997 ICRG 
Average quality of the bureaucracy all years ICRG 
Average Trade ((Export+Import) /GDP) all years WDI 2005 
Average rule of law all years ICRG 
Risk Premium all years ICRG 
Natural Log of GDP, per capita all years WDI 2005 
Education all years WDI 2005 
Latin America dummy all years -- 
Africa dummy all years -- 
OECD country dummy all years -- 
UNCTAD ICT diffusion index 1997 UNCTAD 
Gini index all years WIDER 
Poverty, one dollar a day, head count ratio all years WDI 2005 
Poverty, two dollars a day, head count ratio all years WDI 2005 
Mobile phones (per 1,000 people) all years WDI 2005 
Internet Users (per 1,000 people) all years WDI 2005 
ICT expenditure as a percentage of GDP  all years WDI 2005 
Fax machines (per 1,000 people)  all years WDI 2005 
Telephone mainlines (per 1,000 people) all years WDI 2005 
Telephone mainlines per employee  all years WDI 2005 
Telephone revenue (per 1,000 people)  all years WDI 2005 
Newspaper circulation (per 1,000 people) all years WDI 2005 
Radios, (per 1,000 people) all years WDI 2005 
Televisions, (per 1,000 people) all years WDI 2005 
Freedom of Press Index 1994-1997 Freedom House 
Right to Information (RTI) Index 1970s onwards www.rti-rating.org 





Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
      
Panel A: Full Sample 
 
Gini index 491 44.0 12.7 18.1 73.9 
ICT index (f1) 166 0.0 0.9 -1.4 2.6 
ICT index (f2) 166 -0.1 0.8 -0.8 6.1 
Fax 455 10.4 17.0 0.0 127.0 
ICT expenditure 258 4.6 2.0 0.3 9.1 
Internet users 450 455,735.7 2,677,465 0.0 40,000,000 
Mobiles 679 24.8 52.4 0.0 419.4 
Newspapers 627 119.2 149.0 0.1 818.8 
Radios 684 429.0 477.9 27.9 6763.8 
TVs 676 219.8 197.5 0.5 854.5 
Telephone mainlines 506 235.6 230.5 3.2 1040.1 
Mainlines/employee 654 90.6 71.4 6.7 360.7 
Mainline revenue 639 982.4 607.9 8.2 4380.7 
Average rule of law 684 4.1 1.4 0.0 6.0 
Quality of Bureaucracy 684 3.5 1.4 1.0 6.0 
Risk premium 684 8.6 1.7 1.0 10.0 
Freedom of press index  456 44.5 23.5 5.0 100.0 
RWB score 667 2529.2 2334.0 50.0 10,900.0 
RTI score 371 84.1 19.6 37.0 130.0 
 
Panel B: Developing Country Sample 
 
Gini index 311 50.0 11.0 25.5 73.9 
Poverty $1/day 99 18.7 19.5 2.0 73.6 
Poverty $2/day 99 41.8 27.1 2.0 91.7 
ICT index (f1) 66 -0.7 0.4 -1.4 0.2 
ICT index (f2) 66 -0.3 0.2 -0.8 0.1 
Fax 281 2.5 4.4 0.0 23.6 
ICT expenditure 90 3.3 1.4 0.3 7.4 
Internet users 261 46,263.5 141,327.7 0.0 1,310,000 
Mobiles 475 8.0 19.9 0.0 146.6 
Newspapers 429 50.3 62.4 0.1 435.8 
Radios 480 288.8 353.4 27.9 6763.8 
TVs 472 134.7 136.6 0.5 808.4 
Telephone mainlines 372 143.0 151.1 3.2 977.5 
Mainlines/employee 455 62.0 48.1 6.7 290.5 
Mainline revenue 441 1033.3 668.6 82.0 4380.7 
Average rule of law 480 3.5 1.2 0.0 6.0 
Quality of Bureaucracy 480 2.9 1.0 1.0 6.0 




Table 3: Factor Analysis 
 
Panel A: Eigenvalues of the factors of ICT variables obtained using Factor Analysis 
 
 Factor Eigenvalue 
 
 Factor1 4.534 
 Factor2 0.416 
 Factor3 0.284 
 Factor4 0.102 
 Factor5 0.054 
 Factor6 -0.053 
 Factor7 -0.109 
 Factor8 -0.167 
 
 
Panel B: Factor loadings of the ICT variables obtained using Factor Analysis 
 
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5 
 
Mobile phones/1000 people 0.721 0.240 -0.175 0.026 -0.134 
Internet users/1000 people 0.424 0.359 0.298 -0.037 0.083 
ICT expenditures as % of GDP 0.776 -0.118 -0.149 -0.076 0.138 
Faxes/1000 people 0.849 0.125 0.179 0.124 -0.026 
Computers/1000 people 0.932 0.106 -0.088 -0.144 -0.004 
Mainline telephones/ 1000 people 0.888 -0.272 0.092 -0.119 -0.069 
Telephone revenue/1000 people 0.742 -0.016 -0.212 0.188 0.067 
Mainline telephones/employee 0.550 -0.338 0.219 0.092 -0.013 
 
Notes: Average interim Cronbach's alpha (standardised) = 0.527 





Table 4: OLS Regressions of Gini Index 1992-1997, for full sample 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Controls   Perotti Barro Perotti Barro 
 
Newspapers -0.058*** -0.051*** -0.062*** -0.061*** -0.088*** -0.065*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) 
Radios 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
TVs -0.040*** -0.039*** -0.024*** -0.043*** -0.035*** -0.030*** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Fax -0.364** -0.313* -0.001     
 (0.161) (0.174) (0.155) 
ICT Expenditure 0.172 -0.08 -0.88     
 (0.661) (0.684) (0.681) 
Internet users 0.000* 0.000** 0.000**     
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Mobiles 0.019 0.055 -0.0211     
 (0.033) (0.037) (0.029) 
ICT Index    -0.178    
    (3.082) 
ICT Index squared     10.56***   
     (2.758) 
ICT Index 2      6.162* 
      (3.196) 
Quality of Bureaucracy 0.263 0.552 1.264 -0.190 1.449* 0.583 
 (0.917) (0.982) (0.854) (0.915) (0.836) (0.898) 
Average Rule of Law -3.639*** -2.584*** -1.412 -3.257*** -0.993 -1.078 
 (0.854) (0.904) (0.874) (0.904) (0.818) (0.882) 
Log GDP/capita 3.136** 2.495* 0.578 1.301 3.69*** -0.411 
 (1.361) (1.461) (1.344) (1.681) (1.517) (1.124) 
Education 0.0712 0.104 0.133 0.123 0.383*** 0.176 
 (0.085) (0.099) (0.111) (0.130) (0.137) (0.132) 
Average Trade 0.029 0.003 0.107*** 0.023 0.131*** 0.084*** 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.028) (0.025) (0.027) (0.024) 
Risk Premium -0.627 -1.758 -2.14* -0.697 -1.321 -2.491** 
 (1.240) (1.288) (1.15) (1.286) (1.076) (1.157) 
Telephone Mainlines  -0.013*      
  (0.006) 
Africa Dummy   10.8***  12.47*** 10.73*** 
   (4.046)  (3.635) (4.003) 
Latin America Dummy   13.0***  13.38*** 11.9*** 
   (2.436)  (2.203) (2.317) 
Constant 49.512*** 61.114*** 55.332*** 62.421*** -6.272 66.715*** 
 (17.883) (19.16) (19.424) (23.399) (24.99) (18.099) 
 
N 97 84 97 83 83 83 
 




F-statistic 19.06 15.98 23.79 17.66 20.79 22.12 
 
Notes ***: Significant at 1% level of significance       
 ** : Significant at 5% level of significance       
*: Significant at 10% level of significance 





Table 5: OLS Regressions of Gini Index 1992-1997, for developing country sample 
 
Controls Barro Perotti Barro Perotti 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Newspaper -0.068** -0.065* -0.083** -0.081** 
 (0.310) (0.034) (0.032) (0.034) 
Radios -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
TVs 0.002 -0.011 0.007 -0.005 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026) 
Fax 0.424 0.026    
 (2.13) (2.153) 
ICT Expenditure 0.321 -1.386    
 (0.936) (1.319) 
Internet Users 0.000 0.000    
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobiles 0.013 0.019    
 (0.139) (0.135) 
ICT index   1.004 -2.614 
   (3.891) (5.060) 
Quality of Bureaucracy 2.022* 2.776** 2.246** 2.773** 
 (1.039) (1.201) (1.010) (1.188) 
Average Rule of Law -1.253 -0.536 -1.321 -0.142 
 (1.528) (1.482) (0.960) (1.081) 
Log GDP/capita 4.433** -0.618 3.788* 0.076 
 (1.808) (2.678) (2.135) (2.793) 
Education -0.062 0.2 0.029 0.184 
 (0.088) (0.172) (0.129) (0.195) 
Average Trade 0.012 0.124** 0.036 0.107** 
 (0.034) (0.057) (0.026) (0.048) 
Risk Premium -0.083 -0.73 0.149 -0.212     
 (1.590) (1.560) (1.491) (1.449) 
Africa Dummy  14.4*  9.6 
  (7.192)  (6.782) 
Latin America Dummy  15.2**  11.5** 
  (5.957)  (5.342) 
Constant 24.1 33.8 19.6 20.9 
 (22.642) (23.644) (28.063) (33.089) 
 
N 58 58 48 48 
 
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.49 0.47 0.51 
 
F-statistic 4.46 4.70 5.19 5.04 
 
Notes ***: Significant at 1% level of significance     
 ** : Significant at 5% level of significance     
 *: Significant at 10% level of significance 
 Heterosdasticity robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 6: OLS Regressions of Poverty 1992-1997, for developing country sample 
 
Dependent variable $1/day $1/day $1/day $1/day $2/day $2/day $2/day 
 Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty Poverty 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Newspapers 0.031 0.127** 0.029 0.036 -0.06 0.007 0.034 
 (0.037) (0.031) (0.028) (0.034) (0.051) (0.044) (0.059) 
Radios -0.018* -0.029** -0.016* -0.015* -0.034** -0.045*** -0.045*** 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
TVs 0.059 0.116** -0.008 -0.026 -0.127** -0.087** -0.067*** 
 (0.051) (0.033) (0.021) (0.025) (0.042) (0.037) (0.032) 
Fax 3.753 -3.684   7.426   
 (2.731) (2.468)   (4.444) 
ICT Expenditure -0.034 3.679   -4.507*   
 (1.534) (1.789)   (2.292) 
Internet Users 0.000 0.000**   0.000*   
 (0.000) (0.000)   (0.0000) 
Mobiles -0.076 0.755*   -0.59   
 (0.250) (0.279)   (0.375) 
ICT Index   -1.791 4.791  -9.562 12.274 
   (5.559) (11.170)  (8.049)  (19.144) 
Quality of Bureaucracy 0.432 -0.766 -2.138** -1.628 -1.365 -2.707 -1.988 
 (1.318) (0.958) (0. (1.390) (1.731) (1.535) (1.996) 
Average Rule of Law -0.691 -5.334** -0.058 0.312 5.569 1.857 0.701 
 (2.412) (1.84)  (1.205) (3.422) (1.661) (2.107) 
Log GDP/capita -9.792* -13.542*** -2.697 -2.210 -2.643 -3.699 -5.815 
 (4.462) (2.845)  (3.121) (3.462) (3.449) (5.549) 
Education -0.334 -1.241*** -0.567** -0.629** 0.006 -0.875** -1.107** 
 (0.231) (0.224)  (0.240) (0.178) (0.344) (0.418) 
Average Trade -0.105** -0.238*** -0.089** -0.092** -0.109 -0.159*** -0.287*** 
 (0.044) (0.050)  (0.033) (0.067) (0.042) (0.108) 
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Risk Premium -2.256 4.671 -0.749 -1.090 -3.939 0.658 -0.961 
 (2.002) (3.563)  (1.953) (3.195) (2.738) (3.104) 
Telephone Mainline Revenue 0.028** 0.026**      
 (0.012) (0.008) 
Telephone Mainlines/Employee -0.017      
  (0.015) 
Africa Dummy    -0.648   -22.876 
    (6.859)   (17.811) 
Latin America Dummy    1.294   -10.845 
    (5.021)   (10.291) 
Constant 111.43** 178.77 105.657** 110.579** 123.919** 168.349** 245.095*** 
 (39.504) (91.122)  (33.882) (45.692) (54.930) (91.116) 
 
N 25 21 21 21 25 25 21 
 
Adjusted R2 0.56 0.89 0.63 0.60 0.86 0.87 0.87 
 
F-statistic 3.18 12.17 4.48 3.50 12.60 11.65 12.18 
 
Notes ***: Significant at 1% level of significance       
 ** : Significant at 5% level of significance       
 *: Significant at 10% level of significance 
 Heterosdasticity robust standard errors in parentheses  
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Table 7 Instrumental Variable Estimations: First stage and second stage estimates 
 
Controls Perotti Perotti Perotti Barro Barro Barro 
 
Panel  A: First Stage Results 
(Dependent Variable: Newspaper Circulation) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Radios  0.009* 0.009 0.008 0.169*** 0.009* 0.008  
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.051) (0.005) (0.005) 
TVs 0.077 0.040 0.080 0.161 0.022 0.109  
 (1.59) (0.161) (0.156) (0.192) (0.150) (0.152) 
ICT index 29.804 50.662 0.299 39.358 51.482  
 (29.37) (33.81) (0.162) (37.301) (33.265) 
ICT Index squared  43.821 3.439  41.594  
  (36.04) (0.799)  (34.786) 
Fax   0.000   0.843 
   (0.000)   (1.485) 
ICT Expenditure   0.098   1.297  
   (0.241)   (7.577) 
Internet Users      0.000 
      (0.000) 
Mobiles      0.032  
      (0.299) 
Press Freedom 0.246 0.158 1.089 -1.345* 0.317 0.619  
 (0.787) (0.784) (0.893) (0.704) (0.649) (0.601) 
Log RTI Index 229.883*** 221.652*** 241.034*** 312.697*** 220.007*** 226.509*** 
 (47.860) (47.956) (59.220) (72.084) (47.108) (56.990) 
Log RPI Score -49.520*** 49.968*** -44.050*** -17.757 -48.561*** -51.266 *** 
 (11.49) (11.41) (14.596) (12.322) (10.596) (12.039) 
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes  
 
continent dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes  
 
N 46 46 55 29 46 55 
  
Centred R2 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.95 0.89 0.96 
 






Panel  B: Second Stage Results 
(Dependent Variable: Gini Index) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Newspapers -0.125*** -0.134*** -0.115*** -0.116*** -0.128*** -0.112*** 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.027) (0.016) (0.015) 
Radios -0.001* -0.001** -0.001** -0.011* -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) 
TVs -0.014 -0.024* -0.026* 0.015 0.008 0.013  
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.030) (0.015) (0.013) 
ICT Index 1.164 9.343***  3.440 8.962*** 
 (1.987) (2.652)  (3.913) (3.259) 
ICT Index squared  15.271***   17.063***  
  (4.024)   (4.697) 
Fax   -0.502***   -0.462*** 
   (0.141)   (0.144) 
ICT Expenditure   0.593   0.740  
   (0.568)   (0.884) 
Internet Users   0.00001***   0.00001*** 
   (0.00000)   (0.00000) 
Mobiles   -0.021   -0.029* 
   (0.017)   (0.015) 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes  
 
Continent dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes  
 
N 46 46 55 29 46 55  
 
Centred R2 0.92 0.95 0.95 0.92 0.93 0.93  
 
F-statistic 108.00 106.42 36.43 13.62 63.00 54.05  
 
Hansen's J p-value 0.008 0.003 0.020 0.006 0.007 0.035  
 
Cragg-Donald statistic 15.30 14.80 18.10 9.90 15.20 18.50  
 
Notes ***: Significant at 1% level of significance       
 ** : Significant at 5% level of significance       
 *: Significant at 10% level of significance 




Figure 1 Scatter plot of Gini index on newspaper circulation per 1,000 people, full 
sample 
 
Figure 2 Scatter plot of Poverty $1 a day on newspaper circulation per 1,000 people, 
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Figure 3 Kernel regression of Inequality on ICT index f1, Epanechnikov kernel 
 








Appendix: Countries used in the analyses 
 
Algeria El Salvador Korea, Republic Poland Uruguay 
Angola Ethiopia Kuwait Portugal Venezuela 
Argentina Finland Lebanon Qatar Vietnam 
Australia France Liberia Romania Yemen 
Austria Gabon Libya Russian Federation Yugoslavia 
Bahamas Gambia Luxembourg Saudi Arabia Zaire/DRC 
Bahrain Germany Madagascar Senegal Zambia 
Bangladesh Ghana Malawi Sierra Leone Zimbabwe 
Belgium Greece Malaysia Singapore  
Bolivia Guatemala Mali Slovakia  
Botswana Guinea Malta Somalia  
Brazil Guinea-Bissau Mexico South Africa  
Brunei Guyana Mongolia Spain  
Bulgaria Haiti Morocco Sri Lanka  
Burkina Faso Honduras Mozambique Sudan  
Cameroon Hong Kong Myanmar Suriname  
Canada Hungary Namibia Sweden  
Chile Iceland Netherlands Switzerland  
China India New Zealand Syria  
Colombia Indonesia Nicaragua Taiwan  
Congo Iran Niger Tanzania  
Costa Rica Iraq Nigeria Thailand  
Cote d'Ivoire Ireland Norway Togo  
Cuba Israel Oman Trinidad and Tobago  
Cyprus Italy Pakistan Tunisia  
Czech Republic Jamaica Panama Turkey  
Denmark Japan Papua New Guinea UAE  
Dominican Republic Jordan Paraguay Uganda  
Ecuador Kenya Peru United Kingdom  
Egypt Korea, DPR Philippines United States  
 
 
The developing country sample consists of the following countries: 
 
Algeria Gambia Morocco Yemen 
Angola Ghana Mozambique Zaire/DRC 
Argentina Guatemala Myanmar Zambia 
Bahamas Guinea Namibia Zimbabwe 
Bahrain Guinea-Bissau Nicaragua  
Bangladesh Guyana Niger  
Bolivia Haiti Nigeria  
Botswana Honduras Oman  
Brazil India Pakistan  
Brunei Indonesia Panama  
Burkina Faso Iran Papua New Guinea  
Cameroon Iraq Paraguay  
Chile Jamaica Peru  
China Jordan Philippines  
Colombia Kenya Qatar  
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Congo Kuwait Saudi Arabia  
Costa Rica Lebanon Senegal  
Cote d'Ivoire Liberia South Africa  
Cuba Libya Sri Lanka  
Dominican Republic Madagascar Surinam  
Ecuador Malawi Syria  
Egypt Malaysia Thailand  
El Salvador Mali Trinidad and Tobago  
Ethiopia Malta UAE  
Gabon Mexico Venezuela  
 
 
 
